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In the Greek tradition of political thought, one alleged political 
theory stands apart from the rest, namely the one expounded by 
Epicurus and his followers. It is generally held that Epicurus and 
the Epicureans did not have a political theory, and that Epicurus 
sought refuge from the turmoil of political life by retreating into 
his school. In place of political life, Epicureans formed a small 
society of like-minded friends. This view of Epicurus' social theory, 
I shall argue, is fundamentally misguided. One impact of this 
understanding of Epicurus' doctrines has led scholars to disregard 
many of the important sayings by Epicurus with respect to political 
jus t i ce , and on account of this , we face a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Epicurus' overall social theory. For the 
purposes of this paper, I shall focus on the so-called Epicurean 
primitivism. I shall argue that, in spite of some of the Epicurean 
sayings that might suggest otherwise, Epicurus does have an interest 
in politics, and the alleged Epicurean primitivism is unfounded. 
Some of the evidence used to support the primitivist thesis is 
the emphasis Epicurus places on friendship, which has led some 
commentators to believe that he rejected society altogether. In 
conjunction with a passage from Diogenes of Oenoanda 1, which 
refers to a Utopian time when the life of the gods will pass to men, 2 
implies that the Epicureans had no real interest in political justice. 
Further, the Epicurean motto "Live Unknown" has led many 
commentators to believe that Epicurus advocated some 'back to 
nature' or some primitivism in social arrangements, or even a 
rejection of society altogether. This view has been championed 
by Benjamin Farrington who, in The Faith of Epicurus, argues 
that the Epicurean Garden resembles the primitive 'city of pigs' 
described by Socrates in Book 2 of Plato's Republic. Farrington 
envisions the Epicurean community to be a form of society where 
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the state has "withered away." Farrington writes "only the simple 
form of the state was 'natural', for this was held together by the 
natural impulse of friendship. The fully-developed state, with its 
code of laws enforced by external sanctions, was not natural to 
man." 3 This interpretation is a good example of the so-called 
primitivist interpretation of Epicurus ' social views. This 
interpretation, however, fundamentally misunderstands the nature 
of friendship and oversimplifies and obscures the commitment 
Epicureans have for political justice. The primitivist often consider 
Epicurus' overall social theory to be something like a quietist 
movement. That is, in order to obtain the Epicurean telos, 
tranquillity, one should not draw attention to oneself. The best 
way to not draw attention to oneself is to withdraw into a 
community of like-minded individuals and live withdrawn from 
the rest of society. 
For the purposes of this paper, I do not have the time to explore 
the totality of Epicurean social theory.4 Instead, I shall argue against 
the primitivist thesis by carefully examining the longest treatment 
of the origin of human society remaining from the Epicurean 
corpus: namely, Lucretius' On the Nature of Things, Book 5. The 
last third of this book has been used to support the so-called 
primitivism. In order to defend my position, I will need to 
demonstrate that there is in fact a concern in Epicurus' social theory 
for political justice. As James Nichols 5 has pointed out, there is a 
fundamental objection often raised in connection with Epicurus' 
social theory. That is, that Epicurus has no political philosophy. 
Nichols correctly notes that there is nothing in the remaining 
Epicurean manuscripts of a political teaching like the one found 
in either Plato's or Aristotle's works. There is no discussion of 
what the simply best regime would be, nor of what the practically 
best regime would be in various circumstances. In addition, there 
are a number of Epicurean teachings that would seem to be 
altogether hostile to politics as such and to urge men to avoid public 
life altogether. Epicurus'work on justice was lost. 6 In its absence, 
many of the anti-political sayings have been used to suggest that 
Epicurus rejected society and hence advocated some form of 
primitivism in human social arrangements. 
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Contrary to this interpretation, I maintain that Epicurus does 
have a political philosophy, and in particular an interest in the 
political notion of justice. I agree with Nichols' observation that 
the heart of Epicureanism is above all a teaching about human life 
and how men can lead the best possible life, and what kind of 
knowledge they must have in order to do so. For Epicurus, ethics 
takes precedence over physics, and our theoretical knowledge is, 
in the end, subordinated to the needs of ethics in order to make 
happiness possible. Nichols argues that since most men live 
together with others in political society, a crucial part of any 
philosophy whose goal is happiness must be concerned with man's 
relation to other men, which is to say, with politics. Nichols notes 
that political society makes claims on its members. The whole 
political framework of laws, beliefs, and conventions has a 
regulative effect of the members of the political community. 
Someone concerned with the best way to live must therefore come 
to a clear understanding of political society, which seems to be 
essentially constituted by its justice, by its claim to be just, to 
promulgate and enforce just laws, decrees and decisions. It is no 
small accident, then, that there are a substantial number of the 
Kyriai Doxai that discuss the nature of justice and its relationship 
to law. These sayings must be taken into consideration with the 
anti-political sayings. As Nichols has pointed out, the claims that 
political society makes on its members have a regulative effect on 
the members of that society. This regulative effect could be either 
beneficial to the goal of ethics or hostile to that goal. Hence, I 
tend to read these anti-political sayings as suggestive of a 
reformative element in Epicureanism. This places Epicurus in the 
arena of being a social reformer, not in the arena of rejecting society 
tout court. 
Of the surviving Epicurean texts, the longest treatment of the 
origin of human social organization is found in Lucretius' On the 
Nature of Things, Book 5. This text has been the battle ground for 
the debate over whether Epicurus has or does not have a political 
philosophy. Various portions of this poem have been used to 
support the notion that Epicurus was a primitivist or that he 
advocated some 'back to nature' movement. What I intend to 
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demonstrate, in this paper, is that there is no support in Book 5 of 
On the Nature of Things for the primitivist notion. This is 
important, because the primitivist reading of Epicurus would 
suggest that he does not have a social theory. In order for the 
primitivist interpretation to be valid, it must identify some stage 
in human social development where our telos was naturally 
expressed before society marred or obscured it. The primitivist 
must, therefore, identify some "golden age" in the Epicurean 
account of social development, that is, the stage towards which 
we are trying to go back to. Through a close reading of this section 
of the poem, I shall argue that there is no indication in the poem of 
an alleged "golden age" where the Epicurean notion of happiness 
found its natural expression before it was lost in the wake of society. 
If there is no portion of this poem that can be used to support the 
notion of this "golden age," then the primitivist interpretation must 
be rejected. 
In the last third of Book 5, On the Nature of Things, Lucretius 
discusses the origin of human civilization. This account, read in 
connection with the motto 'live unknown,' has been used to 
interpret Epicurus as suggesting some 'back to nature' movement. 
If society is corrupt, and this corruption is the source of empty 
desires that prevent one from obtaining happiness, then a return to 
an asocial state would seem to be the proper course of action. 
Because we lack any extended texts from Epicurus on justice, many 
of his saying have been interpreted in this manner. Also, because 
of the Epicurean communalism and the historical fact that many 
of the Epicureans lived in small, relatively self-contained 
communities or Gardens, these facts have lent credibility to this 
interpretation. 
I maintain, in spite of the fact that the Epicurean school was 
named the Garden, and in spite of its communalism, the 'back to 
nature' interpretation fails to account for both Epicurus' sayings 
on justice and the Lucretian account of the condition of primitive 
human beings. If we find no indication in the section on the origin 
of human civilization of a so-called "golden age" in the Book 5 
materials, then the primitivist interpretation must be rejected. In 
place of the primitivist interpretation, I would suggest that these 
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passages indicate the origin of socially conditioned desires. It is, 
for the most part, those desires that fall into the Epicurean category 
of "empty" desires that are the focus of Epicurus' larger project. 
Let us now turn to the evidence found in Lucretius. Lucretius' 
description of primitive humans starts at Book 5 lines 925-1010. 
The human beings who lived on earth in those early days 
were far tougher than we are, as one would expect, seeing 
that they were children of the tough earth: larger and more 
solid bones formed the inner framework of their bodies, 
while their flesh was knit with strong sinews, and they 
were not easily affected by heat or cold or unaccustomed 
food or any physical malady. [(Lucretius, DRN 5. 925-
931) trans. Smith] 
Primitive human beings had no knowledge of farming and lived 
off of acorns and berries provided by nature. The condition of 
primitive human beings was similar to that of other wild beasts. 
As yet they had no knowledge of how to utilize fire or 
clothe their bodies in skins stripped from wild beasts. They 
lived in woods and mountain lanes and forests, when 
compelled to escape from the lashing wind and rain, 
sheltered their shaggy l imbs among the th ickets . 
[(Lucretius, DRN 5. 954-958) trans. Smith] 
The life of primitive human beings was, in large measure, a solitary 
and perilous one. Because primitive people did not form societies, 
they were prey for other wild animals. 
They were unable to look to the common interest, and had 
no knowledge of the mutual benefits of any customs or 
laws. Individuals instinctively seized whatever prize 
fortune had offered to them, trained as they were to live 
and use their strength for themselves alone. [(Lucretius, 
DRN 5. 959-962) trans. Smith] 
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Lucretius describes these primitive human beings as being prey to 
'fuming boars and powerful lions' driving them from their homes 
(5.984), and falling prey to attacks by wild beasts (5.990). The 
only interaction between primitive human beings was the result of 
the desire for sex. "Venus united the bodies of lovers in the woods. 
The woman either yielded from mutual desires, or was mastered 
by the man's impetuous might and inordinate lust, or sold her favors 
for acorns or arbute berries or choice pears" (5.963-966) 
The descriptions of primitive man, at this stage, is no different 
from the condition of other wild beasts. Primitive man was subject 
to the randomness of natural forces, lack of food leading to 
starvation and death, and attacks by wild beasts. This primitive 
condition of primitive man cannot be the condition in which our 
(katastematic) pleasures 7 can be realized because it is filled with 
physical discomfort. Nature was not able to supply primitive 
humans with the basic necessities required to satisfy the natural-
necessary desires for life. If it were, then there would be no account 
of starvation in this section of the poem. 
Epicurus' conception of happiness requires the proper use of 
reason, and the condition of primitive man is not one in which 
reason has developed. In order to satisfy the natural-necessary 
desires for life, a minimal level of human society is required. 
Epicurus, in the Letter to Menoeceus, does not caution Menoeceus 
how to obtain food and drink, nor do the worries that disturb the 
soul take the form of how can he obtain clothing and shelter. Rather, 
Epicurus cautions Menoeceus about improperly conceptualizing 
the requirements of pleasure. When Epicurus discusses the limit 
to place on desire, he is not suggesting that an agent should always 
reject luxuries, but rather should not become fixated on obtaining 
luxuries. 
And we believe that self-sufficiency is a great good, not 
in order that we might make do with few things under all 
circumstances, but so that if we do not have a lot we can 
make do with few, being genuinely convinced that those 
who least need extravagance enjoy it most; and that 
everything natural is easy to obtain and whatever is 
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groundless is hard to obtain; and that simple flavors provide 
a pleasure equal to that of an extravagant life when all 
pain from want is removed. (Epicurus , Letter to 
Menoeceus. 130. (trans. In wood)) 
One portion of this passage that I would like to emphasize is that 
everything natural is easy to obtain in so far as one is living in a 
community with other people. Epicurus' reference to barley cakes 
and water, in the sentence that follows this passage, are examples 
of simple food and drink to which an agent should become 
accustomed. 
... and barley cakes and water provide the highest pleasure 
when someone in want takes them. Therefore, becoming 
accustomed to simple, not extravagant ways of life makes 
one completely healthy, makes man unhesitant in the face 
of life's necessary duties, puts us in a better condition for 
the times of extravagance which occasionally come along, 
and makes us fearless in the face of chance. (Epicurus, 
Letter to Menoeceus. 131. (trans. Inwood.)) 
If one were relying solely on one's own abilities to obtain these 
things, and not relying on a community with a division of labor 
and a market in which to trade foodstuffs, then one would find 
that fortune would more greatly affect the acquisition of these 
things. What I mean here is that if someone lived near a fresh 
water stream, and there was little threat that others, who had banded 
together, would attempt to prevent his access to this stream, or 
that the stream was subject to seasonal variation, i.e., did not dry 
up, then the agent would be fortunate. On the other hand, if an 
agent lived nowhere near a fresh water stream, then finding 
drinkable water would be far more difficult. Hence, the absence 
of any discussion of survivalist techniques in Epicurus' Letter 
indicate that Epicurus presupposes that Menoeceus has found a 
way to satisfy these basic needs by living in a community. Epicurus' 
concern, in this port ion of the letter, is with the proper 
understanding of the use of external goods in relation to desire. 
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The next stage in human development, according to Lucretius, 
commenced with the discovery of fire which is closely connected 
to the time when woman united with man and went to live with 
him in huts. Primitive man learned the advantage of cohabitation 
(5.1012-1014). With the birth of children coming from these initial 
couplings, the desire to protect woman and children motivated 
primitive man to make agreements with their neighbors neither to 
harm nor be harmed. Lucretius notes that these agreements were 
made by means of rudimentary communication "indicating by 
means of inarticulate cries and gestures that everyone ought to 
have compassion on the weak" (5.1021-1022). Lucretius indicates 
that there is a change in our nature at this stage. He discusses that 
human beings began to loose their toughness, and that by the use 
of fire, people were less able to endure the cold. This change in 
our nature indicates the beginning of social man, one who is capable 
of living with others because of the agreement neither to harm nor 
be harmed. 
Next they provided themselves with huts and skins and 
fire, and woman, united to man, went to live in one [place 
with him. The advantages of cohabitation] were learned, 
and they saw the birth of their own offspring. It was then 
that human beings first began to lose their toughness: the 
use of fire rendered their shivering bodies less able to 
endure the cold beneath the pavilion of the sky; Venus 
sapped their strength; and children with their charming 
ways easily broke down the stern disposition of their 
parents. It was then, too, that neighbors, in their eagerness 
neither to harm nor be harmed, began to form mutual pacts 
of friendship, and claimed protection for their children 
and womenfolk, indicating by means of inarticulate cries 
and gestures that everyone ought to have compassion on 
the weak. Although it was not possible for concord to be 
achieved universally, the great majority kept their compacts 
loyally. Otherwise the human race would have been 
entirely extinguished at that early stage and could not have 
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Social man was faced with ever new desires resulting from 
technological innovation. The desire for security for the weak led 
to the development of early society and the emergence of social 
power. Lucretius discusses how kings built cities and citadels to 
be strongholds and places of refuge for themselves (line 5.1110). 
Through the use of social power, kings distributed flocks and fields 
to individuals on the basis of their beauty, strength, and intellect. 
Soon thereafter money was invented and became a means by which 
these natural goods could be undermined on the belief that money 
is a means to security in itself. 
At this point in his discussion of the development of 
civilization, Lucretius makes a moral observation. At line 5.1118-
1120, Lucretius notes that "if human beings would guide their lives 
by true principles, great wealth consists in living on a little with a 
contented mind; for of a little there is never a lack." This moral 
observation or moral comment is consistent with several of the 
sayings that we have from Epicurus on the dangers of wealth and 
the need to act only on those natural-necessary desires. 8 The 
position of this moral observation or moral comment is important, 
because it is the first time in Lucretius' discussion of social 
development that he makes an Epicurean moral criticism. This 
remark is wedged in the middle of his discussion of wealth and the 
emptiness of fame and power. In the attempt to secure protection 
from harm for children, women, and themselves, people acted on 
the empty desires without the direction of the Epicurean analysis 
propagated and preserved itself to the present day. 
(Lucretius. DRN 5.1012-1027 (trans. Smith)). 
It is at this early stage of social man that language is developed, 
and early social man was able to develop his reason. 
And more and more every day those endowed with 
exceptional talents and mutual powers showed the others 
how to exchange their former way of life for new practices 
and in particular for the use of fire." [(Lucretius, DRN 5. 
1106-1100) trans. Smith] 
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of the desires. Since people had not reasoned out the telos they, 
mistakenly, attempted to use social power to secure themselves 
against unreal or empty threats. The position of the moral comment 
is important. Lucretius is not claiming that as soon as people had 
made the compact neither to harm nor be harmed, they, then, 
enjoyed some "golden age". I find this important, because this 
initial stage of social man has been one of the passages used to 
support the primitivist thesis. Rather, what we see in the poem are 
various attempts to use social power to secure protection from 
harm are being employed by those who were able to wield it. 
But people wanted to win fame and power for themselves, 
in order that their fortune might be based on a firm 
foundation and their wealth might enable them to lead a 
peaceful life. But all in vain; for as they strove to climb to 
the summit of success, they made their path perilous. And 
even when they reach the summit, envy, like lightning, 
sometimes strikes them and hurls them down into a hideous 
hell of ignominy; for envy, like lightning, usually blasts 
the highest places and all that are elevated above others. 
So it is far better to live peacefully as a subject than to 
desire the dominion of states and the control of kingdoms. 
Let them, then, sweat out their blood and weary themselves 
in vain, struggling along the narrow path of ambition, since 
their wisdom is derived from the mouths of others and 
their aims are determined by hearsay rather than by their 
own sensations; and such folly does not succeed today 
and will not succeed tomorrow any more than it succeeded 
yesterday. (Lucretius. DRN 5.1120-1137. trans. Smith) 
The struggle for fame and power was intensified by the 
invention of metal smithing, and this struggle resulted in warfare. 
Eventually, people became weary of the struggle for sovereignty 
and supremacy for themselves. It is at this stage in our social 
development that laws and magistrates were established. Laws 
were established to end feuds and to rein in anger. 
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Thus the situation sank to the lowest dregs of anarchy, 
with all seeking sovereignty and supremacy for 
themselves. At length some of them taught the others to 
create magistracies and established laws, to induce them 
to obey ordinances. The human race, utterly weary as it 
was of leading a life of violence and worn out with feuds, 
was the more ready to submit voluntarily to the restraint 
of ordinances and stringent laws. The reason why people 
were sick and tired of a life of violence was that each 
individual was prompted by anger to exact vengeance 
more cruelly than is now allowed by equitable laws. 
(Lucretius 5.1141-1151. trans. Smith) 
In connection with the fear of punishment, Lucretius makes his 
second moral observation or comment. What Lucretius goes on to 
say is reminiscent of several of Epicurus' sayings concerning the 
condition of life of the unjust person. Epicurus writes: 
It is impossible for someone who secretly does something 
which men agreed [not to do] in order to avoid harming 
one another or being harmed to be confident that he will 
escape detection, even if in current circumstances he 
escapes detection ten thousand times. For until his death 
it will be uncertain whether he will continue to escape 
detection." (KD 35. trans. Inwood.) 
Lucretius further elaborates the condition of the unjust person by 
noting that the creation of law, and its ensuing punishments, 
undermines the peacefulness of an unjust person. 
Ever since that time fear of punishment has poisoned the 
blessings of life. Violence and injustice enmesh all who 
practice them: they generally recoil on the wrong doers, 
and it is not easy for those who by their actions violate 
the mutual pacts of peace to pass a placid and peaceful 
life; for even if their crime goes undetected in heaven and 
on earth, they are bound to fear that it will not remain 
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hidden for ever. (Lucretius. DRN 5.1152 -1161. trans. 
Smith) 
Although Lucretius uses the language of "poisoning the blessings 
of life," I do not think that too much should be made of this allusion. 
Some commentators convinced of the primitivist interpretation 
have used this phrase as evidence that Lucretius recoils from 
political society. I think this is misguided, because Lucretius is 
making a point well known to Epicureans. This point is seen in 
Hermarchus' discussion of the role that the threat of punishment 
has in compelling people to refrain from harming others. 
The threat of punishment is addressed to those who fail to 
take note of utility. For hanging over them, it compels 
them to master impulses which lead to inexpedient actions 
that are contrary to utility, and forcibly helps to constrain 
them to do what they should. This explains too why the 
legislators did not exempt unintentional killing from all 
punishment; they wanted to avoid giving any pretext to 
people who might intentionally choose to imitate acts done 
unintentionally, and also to ensure that such matters should 
not be approached with a carelessness or casualness which 
would have many genuinely unintentional consequences. 
(Hermarchus, as quoted in Porphyry On Abstinence 1.8 
(trans Long)). 
I take the allusion to the 'poisoning of the blessings of life' as the 
introduction, through the law, the threat that wrong-doers will be 
accountable to society for harms done. That threat hanging over 
the heads of those who would not otherwise restrain themselves 
from harming others preserves the pact neither to harm nor to cause 
harm, and further provides a means of preserving the protection of 
members of society. Likewise, the 'poisoning the blessings of 
life' remark is targeted at a limited audience. That is, towards 
those who would practice violence and injustice. Hence, this is 
not everyone, and, therefore, not everyone is being told that fear 
of punishment poisons the blessings of life. 
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The remainder of Book 5 describes the development of religion, 
how the technical development of metal smithing was used both 
in warfare and in farming, and the invention of the crafts: weaving 
and the arts in general, music in particular. With each technical 
achievement, the material condition of social man expanded, but 
nowhere in this discussion does Lucretius indicate that social man 
had achieved happiness. 
By now people were living their lives surrounded by sturdy 
fortifications, and the land was divided up and marked 
out for cultivation. The deep sea was aflower with the 
flying sails of ships and already they had confederates and 
allies under formal treaties, at the time when poets began 
to record human exploits in song. But the letters of the 
alphabet were invented only a short t ime before. 
Consequently our age cannot look back to earlier events, 
except insofar as reason reveals their traces. 
Navigation, agriculture, city walls, laws, arms, roads, 
clothing, and all other practical inventions as well as every 
one of life's rewards and refinements, poems, pictures, 
and polished statues of exquisite workmanship, all without 
exception were gradually taught by experience and the 
inventiveness of the energetic mind, as humanity 
progressed step by step. Thus by slow degrees time evolves 
every discovery, and reason raises it up into the regions of 
light. People saw one thing after another become clear in 
their minds until each art reached the peak of perfection 
(Lucretius. DRN 5.1440-1456. trans. Smith). 
At the beginning of Book 6, there is a short section that praises 
Athens for discovering farming and for establishing laws. This 
initial praise of Athens sums up the last section of Book 5, where 
the material conditions of social man were brought to their level 
of achievement at Lucretius' time. Immediately thereafter, 
Lucretius praises Epicurus for teaching the way to achieve 
happiness. 
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He (Epicurus) saw that almost everything that necessity 
demands for subsistence had been already provided for 
mortals, and that their life was, so far as possible, 
established in security; he saw too that they possessed 
power, with wealth, honor, and glory, and took pride in 
the good reputation of their children; and yet he found 
that, notwithstanding this prosperity, all of them privately 
had hearts racked with anxiety which, contrary to their 
wish, tormented their lives without a pause, causing them 
to chafe and fret. . . . Therefore with words of truth he 
purged people's minds by laying down limits to desire and 
fear; he explained the nature of the supreme good that is 
our universal goal, and indicated the way, the short and 
straight path, by which we might reach it (Lucretius. DRN 
6.9-18, 6.23-29. trans. Smith). 
I find the location of the praise of Epicurus' mission interesting 
in Lucretius' discussion of social development. If the intent of the 
Epicureans, in their discussion of justice, were some primitivism, 
a return to the so-called "golden age" of interpersonal interactions, 
then one might expect to find Lucretius invoking some sort of 
praise of the condition of man at one of the previous earlier stages. 
He does not do this. Lucretius, we have seen, does offer moral 
observations and moral criticism at various places throughout the 
discussion of the origin of civilization. But he nowhere, in this 
discussion, refers to any alleged "golden age". If there were an 
earlier stage in human development of civilization that were this 
alleged "golden age", then Lucretius would have commented on 
this. Instead, what we find is the development of the material 
condition of civilization, and the technical achievements of 
humanity. With each new development in the material conditions 
of civilization, new empty desires emerge. Lucretius remarks near 
the end of Book 5 that our material possessions and the innovation 
in material possessions are a source of envy. 
The fact is that our present possessions, so long as we 
have not experienced anything more agreeable in the past, 
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please us preeminently and are considered to be the best; 
but when something superior is subsequently discovered, 
the new invention usually ousts all the old things and alters 
our feelings towards them. Thus acorns came to be 
disliked; thus those beds strewn with grass and heaped 
high with leaves were abandoned. Thus too the clothing 
of wild beasts' skins fell into contempt; and yet I suppose 
that, at the time of its discovery, it excited such envy that 
its first wearer was waylaid and slain, even though, after 
all that, the murderers, in squabbling over the garment, 
ripped it to pieces and besmeared it with blood so that it 
was ruined and rendered valueless. Then it was skins, 
now it is gold and purple that plague human lives with 
cares and weary them with war. And here, I think, the 
greater blame rests with us today. For whereas the children 
of earth were tormented by cold when they had no skins 
to cover their naked bodies, it is no hardship for us to go 
without robes of purple patterned with great gold-
embroidered figures, provided that we have the protection 
of some common garment. And so human beings never 
cease to labor vainly and fruitlessly, consuming their lives 
in groundless cares, evidently because they have not 
learned the proper limit to possession, and the extent to 
which real pleasure can increase. And it is this ignorance 
that has gradually carried life out into the deep sea and 
has stirred up from the depths the mighty boiling billows 
of war (Lucretius. DRN 5.1412-1435. trans. Smith). 
The insistence that the Epicureans were some sort of 
primitivists has led some to take rather strange views. This can be 
seen in a recent article by David Blickman. David Blickman, in 
"Lucretius, Epicurus and Prehistory," 9 has argued that the 
primitivist view can be found in the section on music. In this 
section, Blickman claims that music (5.1379-1411) 1 0 was known 
to primitive people. Lucretius' treatment of music is far beyond 
its practical value. Blickman uses this extended treatment of music 
as evidence of Lucretius' primitivism. His argument rests on two 
92 AUSLEGUNG 
factors. First, Lucretius was rushing to finish a long book of this 
poem, and Lucretius did not organize his material very well. 1 1 
Second, the positive value given to references to forests (silvestre)12 
indicate the return to nature element of alleged Lucretian 
primitivism. Blickman uses the references to forests and woodland 
peoples and the pastoral nature of the scenery of this passage to 
support the notion of a kind of primitivism attributable to Epicurean 
social theory. Blickman, also, relies on the gentleness of nature to 
provide for the basic needs of primitive humans for food and water 
(5.937-952) and to the pastoral calmness found in the description 
of the shepherds entertaining themselves after a meal with song 
and dance. 
I do not deny that Lucretius' description of the shepherds 
enjoying song and dance isn't a vivid one. However, Lucretius 
does call these woodland folk "shepherds" implying that they have 
domesticated some animal over which they are tending. As well, 
we have a description of people coming together for the purpose 
of entertainment after a joint meal. This passage, hence, implies a 
social context, and the setting of these dinners follows from the 
stage of human development under consideration. Besides, in the 
other passages describing primitive humans, we do not get any 
indication that joint meals were possible. In fact, the description 
of primitive humans is one in which cooperation does not occur. 
In fact, Lucretius explicitly denies that cooperation between 
primitive humans was possible. 
They were unable to look to the common interest, and had 
no knowledge of the mutual benefits of any customs or 
laws. Individuals instinctively seized whatever prize 
fortune had offered to them, trained as they were to live 
and use their strength for themselves alone. [(Lucretius, 
DRN 5. 959-962) trans. Smith] 
The only interaction between primitive humans that Lucretius 
explicitly mentions is for the purpose of obtaining sex. 
An argument Blickman could have made is Lucretius does 
refer to these woodland people who invented music as "children 
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of the earth." This designation only occurs three times in Book 5, 
and two of these are in the discussion of music. 1 3 This is also the 
designation of primitive humans slightly modified at 5.926, where 
Lucretius calls primitive humans "children of the tough earth." In 
spite of this similar designation, I argue that this passage does not 
justify the primitivist position. Although the people in this passage 
are enjoying music and dance, the type of pleasure they are enjoying 
is kinetic pleasure, and not katastematic pleasure. Even though 
the people in this scene are not harming one another, this passage 
only serves to explain the origin of music and dance. I suggest 
this passage on music serves as a balancing scene in the poem to 
the vivid imagery of warfare that preceded it, and is not the ideal 
of the so-called "golden age." It might be tempting to say that 
through the enjoyment of music and dance we can return to this 
state of nature and shed off the ills of society all together. Rather, 
through cooperative socializing, we might have a venue through 
which our kinetic pleasures might further enhance our experience 
of the telos. I think that even though Lucretius refers to these 
woodland people enjoying music as "children of the earth," the 
modification he introduces here from "children of the tough earth" 
to "children of the earth" is important. By becoming social, human 
nature changed. There is no "going back." 
Hence, as we can see from the above, all attempts to locate the 
"golden age" in Lucretius account of the origin of human 
civilization fail. This is crucial, because, in order for the primitivist 
thesis to be successful, it must identify this "golden age" in some 
part of Lucretius' account. As we have seen from the above, 
Lucretius does not identify any of these stages as being superior 
to any other with respect to achieving the Epicurean telos. That is 
why the short section at the beginning of Book 6 is important. 
That section finishes off Lucretius' discussion of human social 
development. And it is at that point where the Epicurean "mission" 
not only takes place, but can take place. This is consistent with 
the materials we see in Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus, where 
Epicurus presupposes that Menoeceus has found a way to secure 
the basic needs by living in a community. If our basic needs are 
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better satisfied by living in a community, we must conclude that 
we should reject this primitivist thesis. 
Notes 
1. An Epicurean philosopher who had his works inscribed on 
a stone wall in a public colonnade in central Turkey in the second 
century CE. 
2. Diogenes of Oenoanda. New Fragment 21 col. 1, 4 ff. in 
Thirteen New Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda. translated by 
Anthony Long, and reprinted in "Pleasure and Social Utility, The 
Virtues of Being Epicurean" in Aspects de la Philosophie 
Hellenistique. Tome XXXII. Fondation Hardt: Vandoevres: 
Geneve. 1985. p. 314-315. The remainder of the passage is as 
follows: For all things will be full of justice and mutual love 
(philallelia), and there will come to be no need of fortifications or 
laws and all the things which we contrive on account of one another. 
3. Benjamin Farrington. The Faith of Epicurus. Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson: London. 1982. p. 27 
4. I explore and develop an interpretation of Epicurus' views 
on friendship and justice in my dissertation entitled: Just Friends: 
Justice and Friendship in the Social Theories of Aristotle and 
Epicurus. In particular, see chapters 5 and 6 of the above. 
5. James H. Nichols. Epicurean Political Philosophy: The 
De Rerum Natura of Lucretius. London, United Kingdom. Cornell 
University Press. 1976. p. 13-14. 
6. Diogenes Laertius (X: 28) lists two works written by 
Epicurus that would bear on this subject. Peri Dikaiosune kai ton 
allon areton (On justice and the other virtues) and Peri Basileais 
(On Kingship). Both of these works have been lost. 
7. For the purpose of this paper, I define the katastematic 
pleasure, the Epicurean telos, as the lack of pain in the body and 
the lack of trouble in the soul. For further discussion of this 
concept, see Cooper, John. "Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus". 
Reason and Emotion. Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University 
Press. 1999. Purrinton, Jeffrey. "Epicurus on the Telos". Phronesis. 
Epicurean Primitivism 95 
Vol 38. No. 3. p. 281-320.1993.; and Striker, Gisela. "Ataraxia: 
Happiness as Tranquillity". Reprinted in Essays on Hellenistic 
Epistemology and Ethics. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
1996. 
8. VS 67. "A free life cannot acquire great wealth because the 
task is not easy without slavery to the mob or those in power; 
rather, it already possesses everything in constant abundance. And 
if it does somehow achieve great wealth, one could easily share 
this out in order to obtain the good will of one's neighbors". KD 
21. "He who has learned the limits of life knows that it is easy to 
provide that which removes the feeling of pain owing to want and 
make one's whole life perfect. So there is no need for things which 
involve struggle." 
9. David Blickman. "Lucretius, Epicurus and Prehistory". 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. Vol 92.1989. p. 157-191. 
10. People imitated with their mouths the liquid warblings of 
birds long before they were able to join together in singing 
melodious songs with pleasure to the ear. And it was the whistling 
of the zephyr in the cavities of reeds that first taught country folk 
to blow into hollow stalks. Then little by little they learned the 
sweet notes that ripple from the plaintive pipe as the player's fingers 
strike the stops-the pipe invented in pathless woods and forest 
glades, in the solitary spots where shepherds rest in the open air. 
With this music they would soothe and charm their hearts after 
they had eaten their fill; for that is the time when everything affords 
pleasure. So they would often lie in friendly company on velvety 
turf near a running brook beneath the branches of a tall tree and 
provide their bodies with simple but agreeable refreshments, 
especially when the weather smiled and the season of the year 
embroidered the green grass with flowers; for then the rustic muse 
was at its best. Then, prompted by playful gaiety, they would 
deck their heads and shoulders with garlands of interwoven flowers 
and foliage and move their limbs clumsily in an unrhythmical 
dance, striking mother earth with clumsy feet. These performances 
would provoke smiles and peals of pleasant laughter, because all 
such pastimes, being new and wonderful, had a greater effect at 
that time. And the wakeful would find ready consolations for 
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sleeplessness in guiding their voices through many modulations 
of a song in running over the reeds with pursed lips. This old 
tradition is still kept by watchmen today; and although they have 
learned to keep time, they do not derive any more pleasure from 
their music than did those woodland folk, the children of the earth. 
(Lucretius. D/?N5.1379-1411 [trans. Smith]). I provide the entire 
passage here for two strategic reasons. First, although Blickman 
uses this passage to support his interpretation, he does not quote it 
in its entirety. I find this odd. Second, even though this is a peaceful 
scene, with people in the woods enjoying music, we do not see 
Lucretius identifying this as the 'golden age' or the Epicurean way 
of life. As we have seen above, if Lucretius did think this was the 
way to live, he would have made one of his many moral comments. 
The absence of any sort of moral comment, I think, dismisses even 
this passage as evidence of the 'golden age ' . An alternative 
understanding of this passage could be developed as follows. 
Lucretius seems to approve of this type of activity. It is social, 
and looks like a promising development in human social evolution. 
There are, however, expected dangers inherent in it, e.g., becoming 
decedent or encouraging envy. Unfortunately, for the purposes of 
this paper, I cannot develop this interpretation here. 
11. Elizabeth Asmis, in "Rhetoric and Reason in Lucretius" 
American Journal of Philology Vol 104, No 1.1983, has recently 
challenged the notion that Lucretius rushed to finish the poem, 
and in turn, was a "sloppy" writer. Asmis argues that Lucretius 
has fashioned the philosophical doctrines of Epicurus into unified 
essays which are heavily influenced by contemporary rhetorical 
theory, and which are designed at the same time to display the 
logical coherence of Epicurus' philosophical system as a whole. 
In reorganizing Epicurus' doctrines as rhetorical compositions, 
Lucretius continually anticipates doctrines which are proved later 
on in the sequence of arguments. While these would be viewed as 
logical disturbances in a purely logical tract, in the context of 
Lucretius' own rhetorical style of composition they are components 
of a whole, into which they fit perfectly logically. More precisely, 
Lucretius often lifts conclusions from a later context of argument 
in order to clarify and strengthen an earlier sequence of argument, 
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without, however, illogically using these conclusions to prove them 
later; and what accounts for this procedure is that Lucretius takes 
the logical coherence of his doctrines as worked out in advance 
and makes it his goal to defend his doctrines in well rounded essays 
that persuade. Although Asmis applies this rhetorical style of 
anticipation only to her analysis of Books 1-3 of DRN, she suggests 
that the whole poem should be so read. I find this use of anticipation 
and elaboration a useful way of integrating these longer "set pieces" 
in Lucretius. The attention to rhetorical practices when Lucretius 
is writing reminds us that this is a poem and not a treatise, and 
helps us understand the organizational structure of the topics 
presented in the poem as a whole. 
12. A few of the references cited by Blickman are: DRN 5.948; 
5. 955-957; 5.962; 5. 970-972. 
13. The designation "children of the earth" occurs at lines 
5.1411 and 5.1426. 
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